Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
7-2-2012

Mahagében KFT & Péter Dávid: Re-Directing the EU VAT's Perfect
Storm
Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, International Law
Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons

MAHAGÉ
ÉBEN KFT
K & PÉTER DÁVID
RE-DIRE
ECTING THE EU
U VAT’S PERFFECT STORM
Bo
oston Univerrsity School of Law Worrking Paper No. 12-35
(Ju
uly 2, 2012)

Richard
R
T. Ainsw
worth
Bos
ston Unive
ersity Scho
ool of Law
w

This paperr can be do
ownloaded w
without cha
arge at:
http://ww
ww.bu.edu/law/faculty//scholarship
p/workingpa
apers/2012
2.html

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097781
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097781

Mahagében/Dávid
Richard T. Ainsworth
2 July 2012

MAHAGÉBEN KFT & PÉTER DÁVID
RE-DIRECTING THE EU VAT’s PERFECT STORM
Richard T. Ainsworth
On June 21, 2012 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered
judgment on two Hungarian references, Mahagében kft v. Nemzeti Adó-és Vámhivatal
Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Fölgazgatósága and Péter Dávid v. Nemzeti Adó-és
Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Fölgazgatósága (Mahagében/Dávid).1 The
Mahagében/Dávid decisions clarify the CJEU’s earlier holdings in the joined cases of
Alex Kittel v. Belgium and Belgium v. Recolta Recycling SPRL (Kittel/Recolta).2
Kittel/Recolta is a critically important decision. It is central to the EU’s anti-fraud
effort. It is one of three legal imperatives that earlier this year appeared to be coalescing
into a Perfect (enforcement) Storm.3 Both missing trader intra-Community (MTIC) fraud
in goods,4 and missing trader extra-Community (MTEC) fraud5 in services are targeted.
After Mahagében/Dávid the Perfect Storm needs to be re-assessed, because
Mahagében/Dávid limits Kittel/Recolta in some respects, while it broadly re-affirms it in
others. This paper examines the relationship between Mahagében/Dávid and
Kittel/Recolta and then updates the analysis of the Perfect Storm.
Kittel/Recolta
Kittel/Recolta stands for the proposition that a trader who enters into a transaction
knowing or having the means to know that by doing so he is a participant in fraud,
forfeits the right to deduct input tax incurred on purchases that were related to the fraud.
Both the standards that are applied (the “known/should have known” formulation) and
the scope of its application have been debated. Mahagében/Dávid largely resolves these
debates.
Facts. Unfortunately, neither the facts of Kittel nor of Recolta helped to resolve
the standards and scope issues in their time. As a result a re-examination of this area was
inevitable. Kittel and Recolta present basic missing trader carousels. In both cases the
taxpayer/litigant is the “broker” (the entity that pays VAT to the missing trader, claims a

1

Joined cases C-80/11 and C-142/11.
CJEU judgment of 6 July 2006, Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 [2006] ECR 1-6161.
3
Richard T. Ainsworth, A Perfect Storm in the EU VAT: Kittel, R, and MARC, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L. 849
(May 28, 2012). The other elements of the Perfect Storm are: (1) the Criminal Proceedings against R, ECJ
judgment of 7 December 2010, Case C-285/09 and (2) Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010
concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties, and other measures, O.J.
(L 84) 1 (2010).
4
See: Richard T. Ainsworth, Tackling VAT Fraud: 13 Ways Forward, 45 TAX NOTES INT’L. 1205 (Mar. 26,
2007) (assessing the MTIC problem at the time when mostly cell phones and computer chips appeared to
be the medium of the fraud).
5
See: Richard T. Ainsworth, VAT Fraud: The Tradable Service Problem, 61 TAX NOTES INT’L 217
(January 17, 2011) (discussing the morphing of MTIC fraud into MTEC fraud).
2
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deduction, and then makes a zero-rated intra-community supply). In both cases the
Belgian tax authority sought to deny the input tax deduction of the broker.
Nothing in these facts shed any light on how to negotiate the problems that have
arisen since the Kittel/Recolta decision. In the first instance, there is nothing in the facts
that helps divide the space between actual knowledge and no knowledge at all. In Kittle
the broker had actual knowledge of the fraud; in Ricolta the broker had no knowledge at
all. So, what should happen when there is no actual knowledge of fraud, but there are
reasons to believe that there should have been/ could have been/ might have been
knowledge of fraud? There is nothing in the facts to help answer this question.
In addition, there is nothing in the facts that helps limit the scope of application of
Kittel/Recolta. Is the entire supply chain implicated? Can the customer chain also be
involved? In both Kittel and Recolta the fraudster (missing trader) was the immediate
supplier, the party from whom the taxpayer/litigant purchased the goods that went around
the carousel. These facts do not help answer questions about remote fraudsters nor do
they help answer questions about fraudsters in the customer chain. Kittel/Recolta is silent
on these points.
Answering these questions without factual support has become a linguistic
exercise. Positions are staked out in French, which is “the language of the case,”6 and are
opposed by readings based in another official language (notably English).7
Standards. In terms of standards, Kittel/Recolta turns on a trader’s knowledge.
The critical inquiry is whether the trader knew or should have known (in the English
translation of the original French text) that by engaging in a particular transaction he was
a participant in fraud. The question is: Is the expression should have known to be broadly
or narrowly hewn? More precisely, does it mean could possibly have known, or does it
have a far narrower meaning of could not have helped but to have known?8
6

“The language of the case,” is the language chosen by the parties from among the official languages of the
European Union. Originally there were only four official languages (Dutch, French, German and Italian).
Today the main courtroom in the new Court in Luxembourg is equipped with twenty-four interpreting
booths. See: Languages and interpreting at the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg,
(rev. Jan. 2010) available at:
http://eulita.eu/sites/default/files/Interpreting%20at%20the%20Court%20of%20Justice%20of%20the%20E
U.pdf
7
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Art. 29 indicates:
The language of a case shall be Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian,
Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese,
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish or Swedish.
Available at:
http://eulita.eu/sites/default/files/Interpreting%20at%20the%20Court%20of%20Justice%20of%20the%20E
U.pdf
8
The original French text is as follows (emphasis added):
56
De même, un assujetti qui savait ou aurait dû savoir que, par son acquisition, il
participait à une opération impliquée dans une fraude à la TVA, doit, pour les besoins de
la sixième directive, être considéré comme participant à cette fraude, et ceci
indépendamment de la question de savoir s'il tire ou non un bénéfice de la revente des
biens.
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In the French text (reproduced in the prior footnote) the term “savait” is translated
quite normally as “known.” The problem is in the next phrase “aurait dû savoir.” This
expression has been subject to multiple translations: “had the means to know,” or “should
have known.” Literally however, the French phrase is rendered as “would have must to
know,” and this leads to an English translation of “would have had to have known.” Such
a rendering would be a very narrow reading, and would suggest that the standard applied
by Kittel/Recolta is strict and limiting (thus, the number of taxpayers who are swept into
enforcement would be small). This reading would limit Kittel/Recolta very closely,
almost coextensive with actual knowledge.
Scope. In terms of scope, Kittel/Recolta raises questions about proximity and
direction. The proximity question is: How close of a connection does a trader need to
have with the fraudster? Does the fraudster need to be the next-person-in-line, or could
the fraudster be more remote? The directional question is: can a trader be denied the
right to deduct input VAT only if he knows or should have known that his purchases are
connected with fraud, or can he also be denied the right to deduct input VAT if he knows
or should have known that his sales are connected with fraud?
There are two strands to the proximity question. The first is (once again) based
on linguistics. At paragraph 59 the French (emphasis added) text reads: “… il participait
à une opération impliquée dans une fraude à la TVA …” The official English translation
is: “… he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT,
…”9 Taxpayers have tried to persuade the English courts that expression “connected
with” is too broad, and a narrower phrase is appropriate. The intent is to narrow the
connection down to only the immediate supplier. That is, the taxpayer would need to
have knowledge that his immediate supplier was a fraudster.
A better English translation for the French expression “impliquée dans” is
considered by these advocates to be “involved in.” “Connected with” from the official
The official English translation is (emphasis added):
56 In the same way, a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his
purchase, he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT
must, for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, be regarded as a participant in that fraud,
irrespective of whether or not he profited by the resale of the goods.
9
Paragraph 59 the Court’s judgment reads (in French, emphasis added):
Dès lors, il appartient à la juridiction nationale de refuser le bénéfice du droit à déduction
s’il est établi, au vu des éléments objectifs, que l’assujetti savait ou aurait dû savoir que,
par son acquisition, il participait à une opération impliquée dans une fraude à la TVA et
ceci même si l’opération en cause satisfait aux critères objectifs sur lesquels sont fondées
les notions de livraisons de biens effectuées par un assujetti agissant en tant que tel et
d’activité économique.
The official English translation reads (emphasis added):
Therefore, it is for the referring court to refuse entitlement to the right to deduct where it
is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the taxable person knew or should
have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with
fraudulent evasion of VAT, and to do so even where the transaction in question meets the
objective criteria which form the basis of the concepts of ‘supply of goods effected by a
taxable person acting as such’ and ‘economic activity’.
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English translation is too broad. The taxpayer in POWA (Jersey) Ltd. v. HMRC makes
this argument (unsuccessfully). The Court summarizes the argument as follows:
The French text indicates a closer involvement in the fraud than the
broader English expression ‘connected with;’ and that the French text
should be given priority since it is both the working language of the ECJ
in which the judgment was drafted and the language of the case…10
Although raised in several UK cases, this linguistic approach to the “connected
with” language in Kittel/Recolta does not seem persuasive.11 The argument endeavors to
make the language of the case adhere more tightly to the explicit facts of the case than the
analytics of the case allow. In other words, there is nothing in the reasoning of
Kittel/Recolta that suggests that just because the fraudster in both cases happens to be the
immediate seller that the holding of the case is limited to factually similar situations.12
The second strand of the proximity question is found in French domestic
legislation, at Article 271(3) of the Code Général des Impôts, and the related guidance
(binding on the French revenue authority) as to how the law is to be applied (Bulletin
Officiel des Impôts, 3 A-7-07, No. 124, 30/11/07). These provisions indicate that a
taxpayer’s right to deduct input VAT can be called into question only when that person
knew or had reason to know that he was participating in a transaction in which fraud was
10

[2012] UKUT 50 TCC (February 8, 2012) at ¶ 26.
Justice Lewison understood the argument (but forund it incompletely argued) in the joined cases of
HMRC v. Livewire Telecom Ltd. and HMRC v. Olympia Technology Ltd. [2009] EWHC 15 (Ch) (January
16, 2009) at ¶¶ 53-61. Megtian Ltd. v. HMRC (LON/2007/0908) (Dec. 11, 2008) at ¶¶ 17-27. See also the
similar results in Spearmint Blue Ltd. v. HMRC [2012] UKFTT 103 (TC) at 33 where a similar linguistic
argument is made (with a similar result) involving the CJEU’s decision in Criminal Proceedings against R:
Spearmint Blue seeks to persuade us that the phrase “impliquée dans” connotes a much
more proximate involvement in the fraud than the English translation of that phrase,
“connected with”. It submits that a more accurate translation of the phrase “impliquée
dans” would be “aimed at”. It prays in aid the case of R, in which the French version of
the ECJ’s judgment uses the phrase “impliquée dans” but the English version uses the
phrase “aimed at”. It says this is clear evidence that the ECJ has “had second thoughts
about the accuracy of the way in which it rendered in English the phrase ‘il participait à
une operation impliquée dans une fraude à la TVA’ in Kittel” and the meaning “aimed
at” should be preferred to the meaning “connected with”
12
This is the opinion of the Court in Megtian Ltd. v. HMRC (LON/2007/0908) (Dec. 11, 2008) where
denial of an input tax deduction in a contra-trading case where Megtian Ltd. functioned as the exporting
broker on the “clean chain” of a well orchestrated fraud that always involved two or three buffer companies
– outlined in the appendix of the decision, and an admission [in apparent error] that Megtian Ltd. had
“actual knowledge” that it was engaged in VAT fraud. The Court at ¶ 22 indicates:
Whilst it is true, as Mrs. Hamilton pointed out, that the Court did refer in paragraph 56 of
the judgment, to the trader becoming involved in fraud “by his purchase” and that could
suggest that only a direct connection with a fraudulent person was intended to lead to the
loss of the right to deduct, we do not agree that is the only interpretation that can be put
on those words. In that case the Court was dealing with cases where there was such a
direct connection. The Court’s conclusions are expressed in more general terms in
paragraphs 56 and 61 and we have no doubt that the wider construction is correct. That
was also the conclusion of the tribunal in Calltell Telecom Ltd and another –v- The
Commissioners (VTD 20266) at paragraph 46 and Dragon Futures Ltd –v- The
Commissioners (VTD 19831) at paragraph 67
11
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committed by the seller.13 This argument is essentially “the French know best” with their
statutory implementation of Kittel/Recolta, because the decision is in French. This has
not been a persuasive argument in the UK courts.
These arguments however, have apparently persuaded Advocate General Van
Hilten before the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).14 In the common annex to five
joined MTIC cases the AG argues that Kittel/Recolta can be applied to deny the right of
deduction only when the fraud arises in a supplier who is in privity of contract with
taxpayer. The Hoge Raad has not rendered an opinion in these joined cases (yet).
The second question, the directional one, is theoretical. It is based on a plane
reading of Kittel/Ricolta. It states: Is there anything in the Kittel/Ricolta decision that
restricts the decision to a trader’s purchase side? Could the tax authority just as easily
deny a trader’s input deduction if the taxpayer had knowledge of fraud in the customer
chain? This would be knowledge that by his onward sale the trader was facilitating fraud.
This hypothetical was considered in the Perfect Storm under Kittel Stage 2: The
Gathering Storm. The resolution of the hypothetical suggests that enforcement could
easily develop in this direction as the Community searches for new tools in the fight
against missing trader fraud.15 The Perfect Storm indicated:
Stage 2 Kittel takes advantage of the lack of temporal or jurisdictional
limitations in the ECJ decision. Kittel’s linchpin is whether or not the
taxpayer’s transaction is connected to fraudulent evasion of VAT, and
whether or not he knows or should have known about this connection. It
is not important “when” or “where” the fraud occurs, it could be before or
after the current transaction, and it could be within the taxpayer’s Member
State or in any of the other Member States of the Community.16
This paper asks: Is this hypothetical and proposed resolution still viable after
Mahagében/Dávid? The answer is no, not at all. The Perfect Storm needs revision.
Mahagében/Dávid
13

See the unsuccessful arguments made in Fonecomp Ltd. v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 102 (TC) at ¶ 244:
During the course of the hearing the appellant had suggested that the approach taken in
Mobilx was wrong. It referred to the apparent conflict between interpretation of
connection adopted by the French legislature, which appeared to regard the connection
required by the test as existing only if the seller was fraudulent, and the broader test
adopted by the English Courts. It was suggested that we should consider making a
reference to the ECJ if this or any other issue was not acte claire.
14
LJN: BW5440 (May, 11, 2012) available (in Dutch) at:
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ResultPage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searcht...eerd&sortby=rechtsgebied_rechts
praak+asc+ljn&instantie_uz=Hoge+Raad.
15
EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion including in relation to third
countries, COM(2012) 351 (June 27, 2012) (considering the connection between VAT frauds in goods and
services as a window to wider tax fraud in corporate and personal income tax regimes) available at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0351:FIN:EN:PDF
16
Perfect Storm, supra note 3 at 859-60.
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Two aspects of Mahagében/Dávid provide subliminal commentary on the
placement of this decision – (a) the absence of an Advocate-General’s Opinion, and (b)
the inverted sequencing of the case analysis.
Advocate-General’s Opinion. Pursuant to Article 44(2) of the consolidated
version of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU17 and Article 20 of the Protocol (No. 3) on
the Statute of the CJEU,18 an Advocate-General’s Opinion may be dispensed with if the
Court considers that the case raises no new point of law. By foregoing an AdvocateGeneral’s opinion in Mahagében/Dávid the CJEU is putting the legal community on
notice that this decision is only a clarification or re-application of existing law.
What does Mahagében/Dávid clarify? It clarifies Kittel/Ricolta.
Inverted sequencing. The Mahagében/Dávid references for preliminary rulings
arrived at the Court one month apart and were assigned case numbers accordingly. The
first to arrive was Mahagében C-80/11.19 Dávid C-142/11 arrived later.20 In standard
fashion, the Court presents the facts of these joined cases in their order of arrival –
Mahagében first (¶16 to ¶22) and Dávid second (¶23 to ¶34).
However, the legal analysis is (surprisingly) set out in reverse order. Dávid (a
services case) is considered first (¶35 to ¶50) and Mahagében (a goods case) second (¶51
to ¶66). Why the dissonance?
The reason for the inversion is that Dávid is the re-statement (and re-emphasis) of
Kittel/Recolta.21 Mahagében simply applies Dávid (i.e. it applies Kittel/Recolta
indirectly) to a goods fact pattern (and continues with an extended critique of tax
authorities that mistakenly require taxpayers to engage in extraordinary due diligence as a
condition of securing their rightful input deductions).
Kittel/Recolta underpins the results in both the Dávid and the Mahagében portions
of the joint decision, but there are notable differences in the way this is accomplished. In
Dávid, Kittel/Recolta dominates the legal reasoning. There are nine distinct references to
Kittel/Recolta. In Mahagében Kittel/Recolta is cited only once (at ¶53). However,
Mahagében is all but decided in a single internally referenced paragraph (at ¶52) that
simply indicates that Dávid “... also applies in the case of the supply of goods …”

17

Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 June 1991, O.J. (L 176) 7.
Protocol (No. 3) On the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, O.J. (C 83) 210 (March
30, 2010).
19
The Mahagében reference came from a decision of February 9, 2011 of the Baranya Megyei Bíróság
(Regional Court, Baranya), and was received by the Court on February 22, 2011.
20
The Dávid reference came from a March 9, 2011 decision of the Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Bíróság
(Regional Court, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok), and was received by the Court on March 23, 2011.
21
Each of the analytical paragraphs in the Dávid portion of the decision reference Kittel/Recolta (¶¶38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, & 48), and none of the other sections reference any case law (¶¶ 36, 37, 43, 44, 49 &
50).
18
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Thus, the reason we do not have an Advocate-General’s Opinion in
Mahagében/Dávid is that the reasoning of the case is structured as a cascading
reaffirmation of Kittel/Recolta, first in detail in a services fact pattern, and then very
swiftly in a goods fact pattern.
Dávid facts. A Hungarian taxpayer (general contractor) sought to deduct VAT on
payments made to subcontractors for the services of laborers. The tax authority refused
to allow the input VAT deduction, even though it was clear that the work was done, and
the VAT was paid. The reason for the denial was alleged improper acts by the
subcontractors. In one instance the subcontractor failed to ascertain that a further
subcontractor he had hired was a missing trader.22 In another transaction the immediate
subcontractor was in liquidation without records or representative.23 Under Hungarian
rules Dávid was supposed to have documentation available for the VAT auditors on the
status of his sub-contractors, as well as his sub-contractor’s sub-contractors.
The subcontractors are missing traders. The first is more traditional as it sends
out invoices with valid VAT ID numbers to buyers, collects the VAT, but does not file a
return or pay the tax over to the government. The second falls into a kind of missing
trader pattern where sales are made, VAT collected, and then the firm liquidates before
audit (commonly without a return being filed and VAT being remitted).
Mahagében facts. Mahagében kft is a small Hungarian wood mill and processing
plant that purchased acacia logs from another domestic business, Rómahegy-Kert kft
(RK). Proper invoices were issued and paid (along with VAT). Mahagében filed a
timely return and deducted the VAT paid.24 70% of Mahagében’s business is export, so
it is likely that Mahagében returns were largely refund claims.25
On audit of RK the tax administration determined that RK did not have a
sufficient quantity of acacia logs in inventory to meet the invoiced demand of
Mahagében, nor did it have a lorry to make deliveries of the logs. The tax authorities
concluded that the invoices did not accurately reflect commercial transaction.26
Mahagében’s invoices were invalidated, and its input deduction denied.27

22

Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶26 (indicating that the sub-sub-contractor was found to have no
equipment, no registered employees during the period of the contract, filed no VAT return and paid no tax).
23
Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶28 (indicating that in this case there was no evidence of a price paid,
and that the parties indicated on the invoices were genuine, and that due diligence was not performed by
Dávid who did not confirm that this sub-contractor could perform the services needed).
24
Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶16 (indicating that RK declared all of the invoices on its returns and
paid the VAT due, and Mahagében included these amounts in inventory and sold all stocks to third parties).
25
Dél-Dunántúli Energetikai Klaszter (South Trans-Danubian Energy Cluster – an internet-based business
locater service) (indicating that Mahagében is a small family business started in 1998 with one mill and 13
employees) available at:
http://www.ddeklaszter.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22:mahagebenkft&catid=1:tagok&Itemid=3&lang=en
26
Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶17.
27
Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶18.
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Questions before the CJEU. Briefly, the questions under consideration in
Mahagében/Dávid may be summarized as, can a business be held accountable for a VAT
fraud or be penalized by the loss of its right to deduct input tax if another trader
elsewhere in the transaction chain is acting fraudulently?28
The concept embedded in the questions set before the CJEU are at the heart of the
Member States efforts to combat MTIC/MTEC frauds. Stated another way, the question
presented is: How much accountability does a taxpayer assume for the fiscal security of
the VAT chain? Kittel/Recolta and now Mahagében/Dávid place limits on this
accountability. If the invoices are valid, accountability is coextensive with the taxpayer’s
knowledge of fraud in the chain (barring additional conditions placed on the right of
deduction by the Member State in accordance with Article 273)29. Mahagében/Dávid
solves Kittel/Recolta’s standards and scope problems.

28

In a little bit more detail, the questions were:
Mahagében –
(1) if the invoicing requirements have been fully satisfied can the tax administration nevertheless
require more documentation from a buyer that would prove that his supplier: (a) actually
possessed the goods stated on the invoice, or (b) was able to deliver the stated goods; and (c)
satisfied tax its obligations – by filed a return and paying over the VAT.
(2) Does the exercise of due diligence by a taxpayer include being able to prove (with auditable
documentation) that a supplier: (a) entered the purchases (of the items that are re-sold to the buyer)
in the company books (as inventory records); (b) has valid invoices recording these purchases; and
(c) filed the necessary returns and paid the tax on the purchases and subsequent re-sales to the
buyer.
(3) Does the VAT Directive preclude national legislation (or practice) that requires a taxable
person to verify tax compliance of the businesses that issues it invoices? Mahagében/Dávid,
supra note 1, at ¶22.
Dávid –
(1) Does the VAT Directive allow the right to deduct input VAT to be restricted (or prohibited) if
the issuer of an invoice cannot guarantee the VAT compliance of further subcontractors (strict
liability for all VAT in the supply chain);
(2) If the tax administration concedes the validity and accuracy of invoices, as well as the
economic activity, may it nevertheless deny the right to deduction on the basis that other
subcontractors are “missing” or undeterminable, or invoices issued by them are invalid?
(3) In the situation in (2) is a tax administration obligated to prove that the taxable person was
aware of (or colluded in) the unlawful conduct of the subcontracting companies further up the
subcontracting chain? Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶33.
29
The analysis of Article 273 is sparse in Mahagében/Dávid. None of the conditions and procedures of the
Hungarian tax authority were appropriate. In Mahagében this included documentation that would prove
that the person who drafted the invoice (the seller):
(1) was in possession of the goods;
(2) could have delivered the goods.
(3) could satisfy the obligations of the contract (actual performance capability not just promise of
performance)
(4) placed the goods [acacia logs] he was selling into his inventory when he purchased them from
his supplier.
(5) had a good [four corners] invoice for the goods [acacia logs] he purchased from his supplier.
(6) declared the purchase from his supplier, and for the subsequent sale to the taxpayer on his
VAT returns.
(7) paid the VAT on the purchase from his supplier, and reported the VAT on the subsequent sale
to the taxpayer on his VAT returns.
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Solving Kittel/Recolta’s standards problem. This problem revolves around the
official English translation – should have known – of the French expression – aurait dû
savoir. Would this French expression be better rendered as: could possibly have known,
or as could not have helped but to have known, or as would have had to have known?
The answer? Should have known has a broad reading. It simply means ought to
have known.
The CJEU sets out this answer clearly, although a bit indirectly. Kittel/Recolta is
referenced nine times in Mahagében/Dávid, and in none of these instances is the critical
term should have known or any of its common synonyms ever used. Instead, whenever
the Kittel/Recolta standard is referenced the text uniformly adopts the expression ought to
have known.30 It is used four times in Dávid’s restatement of the Kittel/Recolta holding,
once in Mahagében where Dávid (i.e. Kittel/Recolta) is applied to resolve this case, and
then in the final ruling.
Without stating so expressly, the CJEU seems to have told the legal community
that it will translate the expression aurait dû savoir for purposes of Kittel/Recolta as
ought to have known.31
Solving Kittel/Recolta’s scope problem. This is the directional and proximity
question. Does Kittel/Recolta apply only to awareness of fraud on the taxpayer’s supply
side, or is it equally applicable on the sales side? In addition, does Kittel/Recolta apply
throughout the commercial chain, or is it confined to privity relationships of the nextperson-in-line?
The answer provided by Mahagében/Dávid seems clear. The scope of
Kittel/Recolta is throughout the supply chain, and it is not limited to privity relationships
Neither Dávid nor Mahagében present facts that would require the CJEU to
specifically reject an assertion that Kittel/Recolta applied in the customer chain.
However, there are a number of instances in Mahagében/Dávid where the CJEU
expressly applies Kittel/Recolta to the entire supply chain (only). Thus, Kittel/Recolta is
broader than privity, but it does not carry over into customer chains.
The third question presented to the CJEU in the Dávid reference specifically asks
about the supply chain. It asks if a tax authority seeks to deny a right of deduction is it
required to prove that the taxpayer was aware of unlawful conduct, “… in the
In Dávid the same questions are asked, but in this case the required proof extends further up the supply
chain to the person who drafted the invoice for supplies made to the person who then made supplies to the
taxpayer (the supplier’s supplier).
30
Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶¶45, 46, 49, 50 52, and 67(1).
31
This of course does not answer the question of how to divide the space between actual knowledge of
fraud in the supply chain and no knowledge at all. There will be cases on both sides. What it does is
confirm that there is a space between actual knowledge of fraud in the supply chain and no knowledge at
all. There is expected to be a lot of cases that fall within this space, and distinctions will need to be drawn.
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subcontracting chain …”32 The CJEU answered this question in the affirmative.
Identical language is found in three other places (¶¶49, 50 and 52):
Articles 167, 168(a), 178(a), 220(1) and 226 of Council Directive
2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value
added tax must be interpreted as precluding a national practice whereby
the tax authority refuses a taxable person the right to deduct, from the
value added tax which he is liable to pay, the amount of the value added
tax due or paid in respect of the services supplied to him, on the ground
that the issuer of the invoice relating to those services, or one of his
suppliers, acted improperly, without that authority establishing, on the
basis of objective evidence, that the taxable person concerned knew, or
ought to have known, that the transaction relied on as a basis for the right
to deduct was connected with fraud committed by the issuer of the invoice
or by another trader acting earlier in the chain of supply.33
Mahagében/Dávid therefore ends the linguistic debates over the precise English
meaning of the French term impliquée dans, and whether the English term connected with
is sufficient to cover the court’s intent. The Court has now made it clear that the entire
supply chain (but not the customer chain) is within Kittel/Recolta’s scope.
Re-directing the Perfect Storm
After Mahagében/Dávid the Perfect Storm needs to be re-assessed, because the
decision restrictively clarifies Kittel/Recolta - both standards and scope have been
addressed. If we paraphrase the earlier statement of Kittel/Recolta’s holding (with the
Mahagében/Dávid’s modifications underscored and italicized) that statement becomes:
Kittel/Recolta stands for the proposition that a trader who enters into a
transaction knowing or ought to have known that by doing so he is a
participant in his supplier’s fraud, or the fraud of any prior trader in the
supply chain (but not the fraud of his customer or any subsequent buyer in
the customer chain) forfeits the right to deduct input tax incurred on
purchases that were related to the fraud.
The Perfect Storm needs revision at Stage 2 and Hypo III. Hypo III illustrates
how a trader that knew or should have known that its sale made him a participant in this
customer’s fraud would loose its right to deduct.
In Hypo III it was assumed that E in Slovenia intended to be a missing trader
after he sells the goods he has received from D (a French taxpayer) to F, another
Slovenian taxpayer. The goods are delivered to E from the UK, because D is a
middleman purchasing and re-selling goods from C (a UK trader). D functions as a
conduit (or a “buffer”) for C.
The hypothetical then indicates that after F pays E (with VAT), E disappears.
However, because C knew or should have known of the fraud by E, the hypothetical
32
33

Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶33(3).
Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶67(1) (emphasis added).
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concludes that C could be compelled to forfeit its input deduction on its purchase of the
goods it sold through D (in France) to E in Slovenia.
Mahagében/Dávid makes it clear that Hypo III is incorrect. If a transaction is
actually carried out, under an invoice that contains all the information required by
Directive 2006/112, and with all the substantive and formal conditions fulfilled, then:
… a taxable person can be refused the benefit of the right to deduct only
on the basis of the case-law resulting from paragraphs 56 to 61 of Kittel
and Recolta Recycling, according to which it must be established, on the
basis of objective factors, that the taxable person to whom were supplied
the goods or services which served as the basis on which to substantiate
the right to deduct, knew, or ought to have known, that that transaction
was connected with fraud previously committed by the supplier or another
trader at an earlier stage in the transaction.34
Thus, even though each Member State has an obligation under the EC Treaty,35
and the European Parliament to protect each other’s revenues,36 that protection cannot
come at the expense of the right to deduct based on fraud in the customer chain. The
Perfect Storm is re-directed.

34

Mahagében/Dávid, supra note 1, at ¶45 (emphasis added).
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European
Economic and Social Committee, concerning the need to develop a o-ordinated strategy to improve the
fight against fiscal fraud, COM (2006) 254, at 6.
Article 10 of the EC Treaty obliges Member States to take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising from
Community acts, which include administrative cooperation, and that Article 280 obliges
Member States to co-ordinate their actions in order to protect the financial interests of the
Community.
36
European Parliament resolution of 4 December 2008 on the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report
No. 8/2007 concerning administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax (2008/2151(INI))
(2010/C 21 E/03), at ¶33.
Stepping up cooperation between judicial authorities
[The EU Parliament] Calls on Member States to remove legal obstacles in national law
which hamper cross-border prosecution, in particular in cases where the VAT losses
occur in another Member State;
35
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